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Student Awareness of Costs and Beneﬁts
of Educational Decisions: Effects
of an Information Campaign
Martin McGuigan
London School of Economics
Sandra McNally
London School of Economics and University of Surrey
Gill Wyness
London School of Economics and University College London
Many students appear to leave full-time education too soon, despite the possibility
of high returns from further investment in their education. One contributory fac-
tor may be insufﬁcient information about the potential consequences of their
choices. We investigate students’ receptiveness to an information campaign about
the costs and beneﬁts of pursuing postcompulsory education. Our results show
that students with higher expected net beneﬁts from accessing information are
more likely to avail themselves of the opportunity presented by our experiment.
Their intention to stay on in post-16 education is strongly affected by the experi-
ment, though not their intention to apply to university. Effects are heterogeneous
by family background and gender.
I. Introduction
The economic beneﬁts of investing inhumancapital are known tobehigh,
particularly if students pursue higher education (e.g., Blundell, Dearden,
and Sianesi 2005). However, of 16–18-year-olds in England, just under
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30 percent of young people are not in full-time education and about 7 per-
cent are “not in education, training or employment.”1 At the other end
of the distribution, about 35–40 percent of young people go to university
between the ages of 18 and 20.
There are many potential reasons why people drop out of full-time ed-
ucation relatively early and why they do not go on to higher education.
While this may be a rational and well-informed response to individual cir-
cumstances, there is a possibility that at least some young people would
have made a different decision had they been better informed about var-
ious aspects of pursuing education beyond the compulsory years and
about higher education in particular. For example, it may be that young
people are not well informed about the costs and beneﬁts of their future
educational decisions. If lack of information is the problem, a relatively
simple (and inexpensive) policy response is to provide this information
in a timely way and encourage students and teachers to access it. This type
of intervention has been the subject of a number of recent studies in the
economics of education (see Sec. II).
However, it is difﬁcult to compel students to access information if there
is some cost for them in doing so. An insight of the literature on ﬁnancial
literacy is that consumers invest in ﬁnancial knowledge to the point at
which theirmarginal time andmoney costs of doing so are equated to their
marginal beneﬁts (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). The literature on optimal
portfoliomanagement (Ehrlich,Hamlen, and Yin 2008; Ehrlich, Shin, and
Yin 2011) suggests that human capital itself raises a person’s efﬁciency in
acquiring information. Given that there is a time cost to investing in in-
formationprocessing (even if provided freely) anddifferential ability in pro-
cessing information (inﬂuenced by preexisting human capital), a real
possibility is that career-related information interventions may not be par-
ticularly effective at getting to “hard-to-reach” students at risk of dropping
out early.
In this paper, we examine the extent to which young people lack good
information about the costs andbeneﬁts of future educational investment
and whether exposure to relevant information affects their knowledge
and attitudes. We devise an information campaign, the core of which is
a website in which costs and beneﬁts are simply explained. We implement
the intervention as a randomized controlled trial in secondary schools in
London in which half of schools are exposed to the treatment.2 Within
the treated schools, we analyze which types of students access the website,
under the hypothesis that variables likely to be important for inﬂuencing
the net beneﬁts of accessing information also inﬂuence who uses the web-
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1 See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/ﬁle/436526/Main_text_16-18_participation_SFR19_2015.pdf.
2 In England, students go to primary school to the age of 11 and transfer to secondary
schools until the age of 16 (the end of compulsory full-time education) or 18. This exper-
iment involves students in their penultimate year of compulsory education (when they are
aged 14–15). Grade repetition is not permitted.
site. We then analyze both the “intention to treat” effect and the effect of
the treatment (i.e., accessing thewebsite) on the treated.Our results show
that those with higher expected net beneﬁts of accessing the website (i.e.,
those likely to gain themost from higher education) are more likely to do
so than others, and this leads to a strong effect on many of the measured
outcomes of knowledge and future intentions.
However, our ﬁeldwork took place over the period in which the tre-
bling of university fees was announced in England. We show that our in-
formation intervention is ineffective for inﬂuencing attitudes to cost and
the intention of applying to university in the future. Although we cannot
prove that it was this announcement (and the extensive media coverage)
that mitigated the inﬂuence of our information campaign in these re-
spects, we provide suggestive evidence by looking at the control group
over the two waves of our survey (conducted 8–12 weeks apart) and show
how all outcome variables change over this short period. While those var-
iables that are unlikely to be inﬂuenced by the government announce-
ment (and subsequent media coverage) remain largely unchanged, we
can see that perceptions of cost increase among control group students,
while their intentions to apply to university decline.
Despite this, the information campaign (via the website) is shown to
strongly inﬂuence the intention to pursue postcompulsory education.
Furthermore, we show that this effect is stronger for groups less likely
to access the website and more likely to drop out early from full-time ed-
ucation. Speciﬁcally, we analyze the effects for a measure of home re-
sources and by gender. The results show stronger effects for students from
lower-income backgrounds (i.e., below the median) and for boys. Lessons
for policy are that “information campaigns” can be effective in changing
minds (at least in the short term), but those who voluntarily access infor-
mation may not be the group that are potentially most affected by it.
The reason may be that such young people have a higher marginal cost
of accessing information (e.g., a higher discount rate). Yet these are the
groups of most concern to policy makers because of their higher propen-
sities to drop out of education too soon.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section II, we
give a brief literature survey, drawing on different ﬁelds of research to
provide a background and context for our study. In Section III, we de-
scribe the institutional context in England. In Section IV, we describe
our experiment. In Section V, we present a modeling framework. In Sec-
tion VI, we present our results about who accesses the website and the ef-
fect of the treatment before presenting conclusions in Section VII.
II. Brief Literature Survey
There is a growing literature in economics about the effect of informa-
tion on people’s attitudes and behavior. In an educational context, rele-
vant papers includeNguyen (2008), Bettinger et al. (2009), Jensen (2010),
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Booij, Leuven, and Oosterbeek (2012), Fryer (2013), Hoxby and Turner
(2013), Oreopoulos and Dunn (2013), and Goux, Gurgand, and Maurin
(2014). These studies all use an experimental design to test the effects of
information on costs and/or beneﬁts of education on attitudes and be-
havior (albeit in very different contexts). All of these studies ﬁnd informa-
tion to have an effect on knowledge and attitudes, but it is more unusual to
ﬁnd an effect on behavior. Exceptions are two studies on developing coun-
tries (Nguyen 2008; Jensen 2010),Hoxby andTurner (2013) for theUnited
States, and Goux et al. (2014) for France.3 Hoxby and Turner (2013) eval-
uate the impactofprovidinghigh-achieving, low-incomestudentswith semi-
customized information on the application process and college net costs
(as well as waivers for application fees). They ﬁnd this to have a strong im-
pact on enrollment in selective colleges and early evidence that these stu-
dents do as well in these colleges as they would have done elsewhere (in
terms of freshman grades). A study in Paris focuses on providing informa-
tion and relatively light-touch career advice to students at risk of dropping
out of education after middle school (Goux et al. 2014). This is shown to
have a positive effect on the probability of enrolling in vocational programs
as opposed to repeating a grade or dropping out of education altogether.
There are also other (noneducational) contexts in which information pro-
vision is shown to have an effect on actual behavior in developed countries:
information about pensions on retirement behavior in the United States
(Duﬂo and Saez 2003) and information about Social Security provisions
on labor market participation in the United States (Liebman and Luttmer
2010).
This study also links with a literature about how much students know
about wages. For example, Betts (1996) and Dominitz and Manski (1996)
are two early studies in this literature. They elicit future wage expectations
of university students. Although students do anticipate positive returns to
education, there is considerable heterogeneity and it is common to over-
estimate returns. A study by Wiswall and Zafar (2011) also ﬁnds that even
very high-ability students (in this case enrolled at an elite US university)
have biased beliefs about the distribution of earnings in the population
and that students revise these beliefs (and subsequent choices) in response
to information.
The literature on ﬁnancial literacy is also relevant to this study, which
looks at the question of how people acquire and deploy ﬁnancial literacy
(reviewed by Lusardi and Mitchell [2014]). This casts ﬁnancial knowl-
edge as a form of investment in human capital. It deﬁnes “ﬁnancial liter-
acy” as people’s ability to process economic information and make in-
formed decisions about ﬁnancial planning, wealth, accumulation, debt,
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3 In another US study, Bettinger et al. (2009) ﬁnd that information is effective only when
combined with practical assistance with regard to loan applications. Information on its own
is ineffective.
and pensions. Human capital can affect the information acquisition pro-
cess. For example, Ehrlich et al. (2008, 2011) show that optimal manage-
ment of portfolios that include risky assets requires the use of time, effort,
and knowledge and thatmore educated households aremore likely to in-
vest in risky assets and to have higher overall returns. This literature has
relevance for this study because in this case people are being invited to
access knowledge that will improve their future investments (i.e., in terms
of future payoff to education and how to ﬁnance this); but they access the
knowledge voluntarily and not because it is forced on them (even though
teachers may encourage students to access the website more in some
schools than in others).
Models of ﬁnancial literacy suggest that consumers invest in knowledge
to the point that marginal beneﬁts equate withmarginal costs (which will
depend on the cost function for ﬁnancial knowledge acquisition); some
subgroups will rationally choose to not invest in ﬁnancial knowledge be-
cause acquiring ﬁnancial knowledge can be expensive (in terms of time
and money), and greater ﬁnancial sophistication will not beneﬁt every-
one.However, Lusardi andMitchell (2014) argue that despite the fact that
some people will rationally choose to invest little or nothing in ﬁnancial
knowledge, it can still be socially optimal to raise ﬁnancial knowledge
for everyone early in life, as even if the least educated let their knowledge
endowment depreciate, they will still earn higher returns on their saving.
Evidence onﬁnancial literacy in theUnited States suggests that poor knowl-
edge is widespread and strongly correlated with education, although there
remains substantial heterogeneity within education groups.
Finally, the ideas of “rational inattention” models also have relevance
here (e.g., Sims 2010; Matêjka and McKay 2015). These models consider
how agents make decisions about how to process information. “Informa-
tion processing” is costly in that it requires effort and diverts attention
from other topics. Sims (2010) argues that a person has a ﬁnite amount
of attention—or capacity for processing information—to devote to a num-
ber of things. The cost parameter reﬂects the shadow cost of allocating
attention to the decision being considered. Such models explain why
some freely available information is not used or is imperfectly used.
When we develop a conceptual framework for why only some students
choose to access the website, the insights from the literature on ﬁnancial
literacy and rational inattention models are highly pertinent, in addition
to standard models for education investment decisions that emphasize
the importance of cognitive ability and more recently noncognitive abil-
ities (e.g., Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006).
III. The Institutional Context
In England, compulsory school education lasts up to age 16. During their
ﬁnal compulsory school year (year 11), students plan whether to continue
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with their education, with what provider, and in which subjects.4 After
year 11, theymight pursue either an academic or amore vocational route
either in school or in a further education college. The typical route to
higher education (university) is to study three specialist subjects at A-level
and then apply to university 2 years later. This is pursued by about 40 per-
cent of the cohort, with about 30 percent applying to university 2 or 3 years
later. The remainder are more likely to spend some time in a further ed-
ucation college, which typically leads to a vocational qualiﬁcation.5 This
study surveys students at age 15, their penultimate year of compulsory
schooling.
As a result of rapid expansion in the number of students going to uni-
versity over recent decades, the government has implemented a series of
major funding policy changes. In particular, England has moved from a
situation in which higher education was free of charge to all students to a
system in which students are expected to contribute a signiﬁcant propor-
tion of the cost of their education.
Tuition fees were ﬁrst introduced to England in 1998. The fees (of up
to £1,000 per year) were payable up-front and means-tested according to
parental income. In 2006, up-front fees were abolished and replaced by a
deferred £3,000 fee, payable by all regardless of parental income but fully
covered by a fee loan with quite generous terms. The “Browne Review”
reported in October 2010 and recommended that the tuition fee cap
should be removed altogether.6 The government response to the review
came shortly afterward, in November 2010, with the announcement that
fees would not be unlimited but would instead be capped at £9,000 per
year. As previously, the fees would be income contingent and payable
after university over a certain income threshold.
These events received huge press coverage, much of which focused on
the potential negative effect of the fee increases on student participa-
tion.7 The media coverage on tuition fees is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. The
ﬁgure shows the number of hits on the BBC website mentioning tuition
fees between January 2010 and May 2011. The fee increases met with a
great degree of public anger, and a mass protest of tens of thousands
of students and lecturers took place in November 2010. Nevertheless,
the rise in tuition fees was successfully passed through Parliament in De-
cember 2010. The time of these events is relevant to our study because it
can be expected to inﬂuence students’ knowledge of university fees and
their attitudes to cost. Media coverage has tended to focus on the head-
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4 From summer 2014, students are compelled to stay on in some form of education or
training (not necessarily full-time or at school) until the age of 18.
5 More detail is provided by Hupkau et al. (2016).
6 The Browne Review is formally titled “Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Educa-
tion inEngland” and is available at http://hereview.independent.gov.uk/hereview/report/.
7 See, e.g., J. Vasagar and J. Shepherd, “Willetts Announces Student Fees of Up to
£9,000,” Guardian, November 3, 2010; “Coalition Plot to Blow Up Education: Nick Clegg
Faces Student Leader’s Anger at £9,000 Cap onTuition Fees,”DailyMail, November 4, 2010.
line debt ﬁgure rather than the complexities of the loan repayment sys-
tem. That the complexity of the system might be an issue is supported
by work from Scott-Clayton (2012) for the United States.8 Her review of
the information constraints faced by college students argues that com-
plexity is a great obstacle to the effectiveness of student loan programs.
IV. The Experiment
A. Randomization
Our study took placemainly over the academic year 2010–11.9 All second-
ary schools in London were invited to participate. We conducted paired
randomization in which we aligned schools in sequence on the following
dimensions:10 independent/selective or comprehensive, single-sex or
mixed, and average exam scores in the General Certiﬁcate of Secondary
Education (GCSE) exam at age 16. We randomized schools for the treat-
8 However, the UK system is less complex than in the United States (where there is much
more price variation—particularly given the prevalence of private universities, which are
still rare in the United Kingdom). What both systems have in common is a heavy reliance
on student loans.
9 Some schools (not included here) took part in a pilot the previous academic year, and
two schools participating toward the end of the academic year (2009/10) are included in
the main sample here.
10 Since statistical efﬁciency drops when randomizing clusters, we pair schools on the
basis of their pretreatment characteristics (see, e.g., Angrist and Lavy 2009). We then ran-
domly assign one school within each pair to receive the treatment.
Figure 1.—Media reports of tuition fees: count of news articlesmentioning “tuition fees” on
the BBC website from January 2010 to May 2011.
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ment within each pair of schools. Table 1 shows how the randomization
worked on the basis of school-level characteristics. The table shows that
values for the treatment schools are very similar to those of the control
schools at baseline.
There are 54 schools in our main sample, which is about 10 percent of
all schools in London. We survey all students in year 10 (which comes to
6,614 students in total). The participating schools were more likely than
other schools to be independent/selective, have higher average perfor-
mance, and have a lower percentage of students eligible to receive free
schoolmeals. Thus, they cannot be taken to be representative of the school
population. We might expect students in schools with more favorable ob-
servable characteristics to be better informed about costs and beneﬁts of
educational choices than students in other schools. Given that the selec-
tion is probably toward schools that provide better information on careers,
the ﬁndings reported below (on serious deﬁciencies in knowledge) do not
bode well for schools outside the sample. We choose students in year 10 as
the treatment group (i.e., aged 14/15) because this is the penultimate year
of compulsory education (year 11 is an exam year, and therefore, it ismore
difﬁcult to arrange surveys during class time). The future educational ca-
reer of students is strongly inﬂuenced by how they perform in the exams
in year 11 (particularly in English and math). During year 11, they also
have to think carefully about how they want to specialize the following
year. Thus year 10 is a time when students still have a wide range of options,
and it was therefore judged to be a good stage at which to implement the
information experiment.
TABLE 1
Characteristics of Invited Schools
All Schools
Invited
Treatment
Schools
Control
Schools
Difference
between
Treatment
and Control*
Number of schools 515 27 27
GCSE points score 424 445 (83) 438 (107) 6.92 (18)
Proportion with 5 or more GCSE
grades at A*–C .77 .84 .80 .04
Proportion with 5 or more GCSE
grades at A*–C (including
English and math) .55 .62 .62 0
All-girls’ school .24 .37 .37 0
All-boys’ school .14 .19 .19 0
Independent (15 schools) or
academically selective state
schools (3 schools) .24 .33 .33 2.04 (.06)
Proportion eligible for free
school meals .17 .12 .16 2.04 (.04)
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Treatment and control differences in 2009.
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B. Logistics
In the letter of invitation, we explained that the purpose of the study was
to learn about how much students know about economically relevant
facts with regard to pursuing postcompulsory education. As an incentive
to participate, we promised each school that we would give it resourcema-
terials on this issue at some stage during the academic year (without say-
ing when) and that we would give it a school-level report proﬁling its stu-
dents compared to similar schools involved in the study. All participating
schools were expected to give us 40minutes of class time on two occasions
during the school year (8–12 weeks apart) to survey all students in year 10
(i.e., 14/15-year-olds). Attrition is not an issue in this study.
In each school we set up ameeting with relevant teachers in all the par-
ticipating schools (regardless of treatment status), and we explained lo-
gistical aspects of surveys, which were to be conducted under exam con-
ditions. We prepared a short introductory video to be shown to students
before completion. We also sent a representative to every school on the
day of the survey.
The ﬁrst survey was scheduled at a time convenient to the school. We
asked only that the second survey should be 8–12 weeks after the ﬁrst sur-
vey in each participating school. These surveys were time-tabled to take
place mainly during the ﬁrst two terms of 2010/11.
C. The Treatment
The central component of the information package was a specially de-
signed password-protected website (Whats4me), which we designed to in-
clude important information about the costs andbeneﬁts of pursuingpost-
compulsory education, including simple information about wage premia
and employment prospects (derived from the Labour Force Survey be-
tween 2000 and 2009 for those aged 30–35) as well as information about
university tuition fees, maintenance grants, and loans (which we updated
as and when information changed).
We developed other materials that could be used to complement or
substitute for the website. This included a one-page leaﬂet with key infor-
mation about the beneﬁts and costs of higher education, a 5-minute video
that featured images and charts from the website, and a PowerPoint pre-
sentation that could be used as a lesson to give to students. We also gave
teachers access to the website and a school code that would allow access
to anyone in the school. As the experiment is now over, the website has
been converted to an open-access website (http://www.whats4.me.uk/).
Other materials used as part of the experiment can be downloaded from
this website (including the questionnaires completed by students). See
online appendix D for a sample of the information provided.
We initially encouraged students to access the website via e-mail. After
the ﬁrst couple of weeks, we sent all the other materials to teachers and
encouraged them to use the website. Very few students accessed the web-
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site in the ﬁrst 2 weeks, that is, with only prompting from the researchers.
The proportion accessing the website went up from 4 percent to 16 per-
cent when teachers became involved, indicating the importance of in-
volving teachers and schools in information campaigns. In all but one
treatment school, at least some students did access the website. We were
unable tomonitor the extent to which teachers actually used the material.
However, in a series of questions from the two surveys, we measure the ex-
tent to which the information campaign changes whether students talk to
various people about plans for studying in the future. The only signiﬁcant
effect is an increase in the probability that students talk to teachers about
future study plans as part of a lesson (an increase of 5 percentage points,
from a baseline of 40 percent).
We show two sets of estimates. First, we show whether there is an aver-
age effect of being assigned to the experiment (i.e., students in schools
who are randomized to receive the information package compared to
those who are not). This is the “intention to treat” effect. While it reﬂects
the effect of the experiment, it does not necessarily reﬂect the impact of
receiving and absorbing information. Some students may have ignored
our information package because they had already received similar infor-
mation. The intention to treat effect will not capture the (positive) effect
such information might have had on such students if they had not been
able to acquire it elsewhere or had it been provided earlier. Other stu-
dents may not be interested in acquiring information because they have
alreadymade up theirminds not to pursue additional schooling and thus
might dismiss the information package as irrelevant for them. And then
there will be another group of students for whom the expected net ben-
eﬁt from acquiring information is not positive (discussed in Sec. V) or
who ﬁnd it difﬁcult to process the information made available. They will
choose not to access the website. To get a sense of the effect of the treat-
ment on those students who actually choose to receive the information
package, we present a second set of estimates based on “treatment on
the treated,” where accessing the website is interpreted as the “treated.”
This assumes that students taking the intervention seriously would have
accessed the website, which was the core part of the intervention.11 Esti-
mating this effect involves predicting who will access the website on the
basis of the random assignment of schools to the intervention (i.e., using
an instrumental variable strategy). Of course this estimate will reﬂect the
effect of the intervention on only a speciﬁc subgroup: those interested in
accessing information. One would expect the effect of the treatment to
be larger on those willing to use the website. Thus the treatment on the
treated estimate should be bigger than the intention to treat estimate.
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11 A larger group of students might have taken the information seriously through other
aspects of the treatment (such as the one-page leaﬂet provided to treatment schools or the
PowerPoint slides given to the teacher) even if they did not access the website. One might
speculate that the effect of the treatment on these studentsmight lie somewhere in between
the intention to treat effect and the treatment on the treated effect.
In table 2, we show prepolicy differences in the full set of outcome var-
iables used in this study (which are described fully in App. A). They cover
sets of questions on (a) knowledge of student ﬁnance, (b) perceived im-
portance of ﬁnancial constraints, (c) opportunity cost, (d) knowledge about
the beneﬁts of staying on, (e) estimates of costs and beneﬁts, and ( f ) future
intentions. The averages for treatment and control schools are all similar at
baseline and never statistically different from each other. Within treated
schools, those who access the website are similar to those who do not on
many dimensions. However, those who access the website have a lower ex-
pected opportunity cost (fromgoing to university), have better prior knowl-
edge in somedimensions (although theonly signiﬁcant difference is on the
question about earnings by subject, i.e., “will earn about the samenomatter
what subject I study”), and aremore likely to plan to stay in full-time educa-
tion beyond the age of 16 and to apply to go to university at some stage (i.e.,
“very likely will ever apply to university to do a degree”). We now describe a
modeling framework for who accesses the website and how we estimate the
impact of accessing the website on outcome variables.
V. Modeling Framework
Following our discussion of models of the acquisition of ﬁnancial literacy
and rational inattention models (in Sec. II), we consider the decision to
use the website developed here as a form of human capital investment.
In the background there is a simple model of human capital accumu-
lation proposed by Rosen (1977): when making decisions about educa-
tional investment, individuals who differ in ability, A, maximize the pres-
ent value of lifetime earnings (y). They compare beneﬁts with costs in
making decisions about how much schooling (s) to acquire. Thus
y 5 f s; Að Þ:
This beneﬁt-cost decision regarding how much schooling (s) to acquire
involves estimating the discounted value of schooling net of forgone earn-
ings (i.e., the opportunity cost for time they could have spent in the labor
market). This will be inﬂuenced by the price of the skills acquired at
school, the interest (discount) rate, and the ability of the individual. The
beneﬁt of schooling is increasing in both ability and the price of skills ac-
quired and decreasing in the interest rate. This basic model has been de-
veloped in many ways. For example, noncognitive skills and motivation
are known to inﬂuence schooling decisions and earnings (e.g., Heckman
et al. 2006). Family background also plays a major role, both via its role in
the formation of human capital at every stage in the life cycle and poten-
tially through the cost (e.g., families compensating for imperfect capital
markets by helping to ﬁnance postcompulsory education for their chil-
dren).
A student considering whether or not to invest in acquiring informa-
tion about potential future education might be regarded as inﬂuenced
492 Journal of Human Capital
by the same factors that determine whether that investment will actually
bemade. For example, the anticipated value of informationmight be pos-
itively inﬂuenced by the student’s cognitive and noncognitive abilities
andmotivation and the expected price of skills in the labor market. Con-
versely, the decision to invest in acquiring information will be negatively
inﬂuenced by cost. Since access to the website is free, the cost of relevance
is the opportunity cost of time. As noted in the rational inattention frame-
work (e.g., Sims 2010), information processing is costly in that it requires ef-
fort and diverts attention fromother topics. “Rationally inattentive agents”
process information they ﬁnd useful and ignore information that is not
worth the effort of acquiring andprocessing.Weposit that the opportunity
cost of time depends on the extent to which individuals are impatient or
present oriented (i.e., high discount rates) and the speed at which they
can process information (which depends on ability).
Thus, individuals will decide whether or not to access the website (Ac-
cess) on the basis of a comparison of their marginal cost (i.e., time) and
marginal beneﬁt: individual i will choose to access the website as long as
the marginal beneﬁt (MB) from doing so is at least equal to the marginal
cost (MC):
Accessi 5 1 if MBi ≥ MCi:
The beneﬁts depend on students’ expectations about the usefulness of
the information, which depends on the same factors that inﬂuence edu-
cational investment decisions (i.e., cognitive and noncognitive abilities,
motivation, and family background). The costs depend on individuals’
discount rate and the speed at which they can process information, which
again depends on cognitive abilities.
Using this framework, we estimate a reduced-form model of the deci-
sion to access the website:
Accessis 5 b0 1 b1Ais 1 b2Pis 1 b3Fis 1 b4Ois 1 b4Pairs 1 mis: (1)
Whether individual i accesses the website in school s is function of a vec-
tor of abilities A (cognitive and noncognitive), the extent to which the in-
dividual is present oriented (P ), family background (F ), and personal
characteristics thatmight affect costs and beneﬁts of obtaining additional
information (O). Pair is a dummy variable for each school pair (there are
27 pairs in which one school is randomly assigned to treatment). We also
estimate thismodel within treatment schools and control for school ﬁxed
effects (as teachers may be more enthusiastic about the experiment in
some treatment schools than in others).
As the beneﬁt of investing in schooling is inﬂuenced by ability, so too
will be the perceived beneﬁt of acquiring information about future
schooling. Furthermore, student ability inﬂuences the speed at which in-
formation can be processed (and thus affects the cost of acquiring in-
formation). We measure cognitive ability using proxies such as students’
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self-assessed ability. For the full sample, we have information on whether
the individual considers himself or herself to be good atmath and English
and whether he or she likes these subjects (which also capture prefer-
ences). For a subsample, we have teacher-assessed performance in math
and English the previous year. Our preferred methodology is to use the
full sample because otherwise we lose 40 percent of our observations and
the treatment and control schools are not well matched in terms of base-
line characteristics. However, we show that teacher assessment on math
and English makes little difference to our regression results. Measures of
noncognitive abilities include self-esteem and locus of control. The mea-
sure of self-esteem is constructed from student responses to seven ques-
tions inquiring about their perceptions of their own self-worth. The locus
of control is a six-item index scale constructed from responses to questions
that inquired about the amount of control students had over their own
lives. Both questions are adopted from the (US) National Education Lon-
gitudinal Study of 1988 and are detailed in Appendix B, along with other
variables that we use in this analysis.
Wemeasure the degree to which students are present oriented by their
response to the question “if you were offered £1,000 today or £1,100 in
one year’s time, what would you prefer?” Students with high discount
rates have a higher opportunity cost of time. Thus, one might expect stu-
dents who are more present oriented to invest less time in acquiring in-
formation about the future consequences of educational investment.
We measure family background by books in the home, which is often
used as a measure of family resources. One might expect family back-
ground to inﬂuence educational investment decisions because of its role
in the formation of human capital (which is increasing in the family’s as-
sets) and because better-off families can help to alleviate credit constraints.
This might increase the perceived net beneﬁts of acquiring information
about future educational options. Finally, we include gender and whether
the individual “talks a lot to teachers/friends/family” about careers. The
latter might positively inﬂuence the amenability of students to further in-
formation and the extent to which this is easily processed.
Having considered factors that inﬂuence whether individuals access
information, we then estimate both the intention to treat effect from
our experiment and the treatment on the treated effect. The latter in-
volves using randomly assigned treatment status to predict whether or
not the individual accesses the website. Thus, we estimate (posttreatment)
Yis 5 a1Ts 1 a2Pairs 1 εis, (2)
whereY is the aspect of knowledge/aspirations being asked of studenti in
school s,Ts is whether schools is assigned treatment status, and Pair is a
dummy variable for each school pair (there are 27 pairs in which one
school is randomly assigned to treatment). The intention to treat effect
is given by a1.
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Then we estimate
Yis 5 J1Accessis 1 J2Pairs 1 lis, (3)
where J1 is the instrumental variable (IV) estimate of the effect of access-
ing the website on the outcome variables. It represents a “local average
treatment effect” (LATE) because the coefﬁcient reﬂects the impact of
accessing the information only on students who actually use the website
(which is not necessarily the same as the average effect had all students in
treatment schools accessed the website). Thus, we can infer that the ef-
fects pertain mainly to students with characteristics that had a stronger
probability of accessing the website (outlined above). As we have an in-
strument that strongly predicts access to the website (i.e., random assign-
ment of the treatment), we should not expect J1 to be sensitive to the in-
clusion of variables that inﬂuence access to the website (i.e., in [1]).
However, we show regressions in which such variables are included.
We lookmore closely at the determinants of students’ future education
intentions: whether a student intends to stay on in full-time education be-
yond the age of 16 and whether he or she intends to apply to university to
do a degree. Thus we show a speciﬁcation similar to (1) in which the de-
pendent variable represents student intentions rather than access to the
website. As these intentions foreshadow future educational investment
decisions, one would expect the same variables to be relevant for the rea-
sons described above. This also helps to put the estimate of the effect of
accessing the website (at a point in time) in a wider context.
VI. Results
A. Who Accesses the Website?
As discussed in Section IV, 16 percent of eligible students (i.e., those in
treated schools) access the website. In this section, we estimate model (1)
to understand to what extentmeasured characteristics inﬂuence the prob-
ability that students access the website. The included variables are chosen
in an attempt to proxy underlying factors that inﬂuence students’ costs and
beneﬁts of using their time in this way, such as cognitive skills and ten-
dency to discount the future (as discussed in Sec. V).
In table 3, we show the results of estimatingmodel (1).12 Column 1 con-
trols for the school pair (i.e., within which randomization to treatment
status was assigned). Column 2 estimates the regression only within treat-
ment schools (since only students within these schools had the option to
access the website) and additionally controls for school ﬁxed effects. Col-
umn 3 repeats this regression for the subsample of students that can be
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12 Estimates from a probit model (i.e., marginal effects computed at the average values)
suggest almost exactly the same magnitude for estimated effects from a linear probability
model for col. 1. Results are available on request.
linked to administrative data. The latter estimates allow us to include var-
iables that measure the teacher’s assessment of the student in the previ-
ous school year in math and English. They also allow us to measure
whether the student is eligible to receive free school meals.
As discussed above, one would expect students with higher levels of
cognitive and noncognitive ability to perceive a higher beneﬁt from ac-
quiring information about future schooling decisions and to be better
able to process information. The regression results partially support this.
TABLE 3
Whether Accesses Website
OLS
(1)
School Fixed
Effects
(2)
As Col. 2: Only
Schools That Can
Be Linked to
Administrative Data
(3)
Good at math .01 .01 .04
(.01) (.02) (.03)
Good at English 2.02 2.01 2.01
(.01) (.02) (.02)
Likes math .02*** .04*** .04*
(.01) (.01) (.02)
Likes English 2.00 .00 .02
(.01) (.01) (.02)
Locus of control 2.01 2.03** 2.04**
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Self-esteem .02** .03** .01
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Present oriented 2.01 2.01 2.02*
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Books in the home .01* .02** .02**
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Male 2.05** 2.05** 2.06*
(.02) (.02) (.03)
Talks a lot to teachers/friends/
family about careers .00 .02** .03**
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Whether eligible to receive free
school meals 2.02
(.02)
Whether achieves “expected level”
in English (teacher assessment,
age 14) .01
(.03)
Whether achieves “expected level”
in math (teacher assessment,
age 14) 2.01
(.02)
Observations 5,534 2,943 1,729
R 2 .11 .26 .11
Note.—Full variable descriptions are provided in App. B. Standard errors are clustered at
the school level. In cols. 1, 2, and 3, there are 54, 27, and 18 clusters, respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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For example, the probability of accessing the website is positively related
to whether the student likesmath (which could be considered a proxy for
ability as well as reﬂecting a preference toward study). However, the other
measures of cognitive ability (i.e., liking English, self-assessed ability at
English and math, teacher assessment of English and math) do not have
any additional impact.
Of the measures of noncognitive ability (i.e., self-esteem and locus of
control), self-esteem has the expected positive association (for the full
sample, in cols. 1 and 2) with accessing the website. Students with higher
self-esteem are more likely to seek out information by accessing the web-
site. On the other hand, locus of control has a negative association, which
seems counterintuitive: students who believe they havemore control over
their lives are less likely to use the website.
The measure of family resources (books in the home) has a consistent
positive association with accessing the website, as one would expect be-
cause better-off families have had more opportunity for prior investment
in their children’s human capital and may be able to alleviate credit con-
straints. Such students are more likely to ﬁnd it in their interest to invest
in information acquisition and thus access the website.
Girls are more likely than boys to access the website. This chimes with
the growing literature on the gender imbalance in participation in higher
education (e.g., Bailey and Dynarksi 2011; Crawford and Greaves 2015).
The results also indicate that students who talk a lot to teachers/parents/
friends about career-related information are more likely to access the
website, reﬂecting the amenability of these students to acquiringmore in-
formation through the website. Finally, being present oriented has a weak
negative association with accessing the website, meaning that those with a
high discount rate are less likely to access the website. The coefﬁcient is
statistically signiﬁcant within the subsample of students in treatment schools
that can be matched to administrative data.
It is notable that the R2 decreases by over 50 percent between columns 2
and 3 (from .26 to .11). This reﬂects the importance of the schools that
are lost when we use only those students and schools that can bematched
to administrative data (i.e., which include the seven independent schools
that are in the treatment).13 The extent of website use varies strongly be-
tween state schools and independent schools, with a much higher prob-
ability of access within the latter type. Speciﬁcally, the percentage of stu-
dents accessing the website within treated schools in the state sector is
12 percent whereas it is 37 percent within independent schools. These
schools are all fee paying and are attended by students with a high socio-
economic background. While the higher probability of access within
these schools might reﬂect the demographics of these students (i.e., high
socioeconomic background and high achieving), it might also reﬂect the
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13 There are two additional state schools that do not match to the administrative data for
other reasons.
different characteristics of these schools. For example, they are better
resourced with computers and so forth, and teachers potentially have
more time to devote to career advice and guidance given that they do
not have to apply the National Curriculum and are most likely dealing
with a cohort of students with very high career aspirations.
In summary, taking treatment schools as a whole, we learn that the pro-
ﬁle of those accessing the website ismore likely to be female, self-conﬁdent,
with a proﬁciency/taste for math, and from better-off family backgrounds.
However, collectively the variables measure at most one-quarter of the var-
iation in who accesses the website (i.e., col. 2).
B. Effect of the Treatment
In table 4, we show the intention to treat effect (col. 2), the estimated ef-
fect of the treatment on the treated (i.e., the IVestimate for who accesses
the website, in col. 3), and the sensitivity of the regression for including
additional controls for who accesses the website (col. 4) as described in
the previous section. As expected, including these additional controls does
not affect the estimated treatment on the treated effect. For reference, we
also show themeanof the variables at baseline in the control group (col. 1).
We report clustered standard errors computed using the cluster-correlated
Huber-White estimator.14
We report ﬁve sets of variables here: those reﬂecting knowledge of stu-
dent ﬁnance, the perceived importance of the ﬁnancial constraint, the
opportunity cost, knowledge about the beneﬁts of staying on, and future
intentions (although we leave discussion on expected wages and univer-
sity fees to the section below).
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the effect of the treatment on the treated
is always substantially higher than the intention to treat effect. This shows
that the effect of accessing the website was substantial for those who did
access it. The effects of the treatment are evident for variables reﬂecting
knowledge of student ﬁnance, the opportunity cost, knowledge about the
beneﬁts of further educational investment, and intentions to pursue
postcompulsory education (though not going to university).
Starting with knowledge of student ﬁnance, the baseline survey re-
vealedworrying gaps in students’ knowledge of the basics. This is reﬂected
in average responses at baseline in the control schools (col. 1). About half
of the students in the control group did not know when university fees
14 This is the case throughout our analysis. We have also estimated the intention to treat
effects using the wild-bootstrap cluster-t procedure, which is potentially important in trials
in which the number of clusters is small (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008). When con-
sidering the estimated p -values of tests of the null that the coefﬁcient is zero, results are
mostly consistent with the results reported here (i.e., the p -value < .05 when results are sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero and ismore sizable when they are not).However, there is some
room for doubt within the subset of variables about “knowledge about beneﬁts of staying
on.” This is reported in App. C.
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were paid or that student loans are granted on favorable terms. These
misperceptions were largely corrected for those who accessed the website.
Accessing the website increased the probability of knowing when univer-
sity fees are paid by 41 percent (from a baseline of 45 percent) and in-
creased the probability of students agreeing with the statement “student
loans are a cheaper/better way to borrow money than other types of bor-
rowing” by 25 percent (from a baseline of 51 percent).
About one-quarter of students at baseline were concerned about the
opportunity cost of going to university, agreeing with the statement “go-
ing to university would mean waiting too long before I could earn a full-
time wage.” The concern disappeared for about one-ﬁfth of those who
accessed the website.
While the majority (80 percent) of students had already grasped the
employment-related beneﬁts of staying on in education to age 18 or go-
ing to university (i.e., that the probability of getting a job would improve),
only around half were aware that employment probabilities differ by in-
stitution attended and subject studied. The website both increased the
perception of beneﬁts in terms of the probability of getting a job and im-
proved students’ understanding that institutions can make a difference
to expected earnings, although the experiment did not have a signiﬁcant
effect on students’ understanding of the impact of subject choice on fu-
ture earnings.
Despite the improvements in knowledge of the generosity of the stu-
dent ﬁnance system and the beneﬁts associated with staying on in full-
time education and/or attending university, students were just as likely
as before to report being put off from staying on in education or going
to university because of the cost and to report that “going to university
is too expensive for me andmy family” (i.e., the three variables reﬂecting
the perceived importance of the ﬁnancial constraint). The website also
did not change their intention to apply to university at some stage. How-
ever, plans to stay on in full-time education beyond the age of 16 were very
strongly and positively affected by access to the website.
Given that the experiment was effective in many dimensions, there are
two potential puzzles: (1) Why did students’ increased knowledge of (the
favorable conditions of) student ﬁnance not reduce the perceived impor-
tance of the ﬁnancial constraint of going to university? (2)Why did chang-
ing minds about the opportunity cost of going to university and beneﬁts
of staying on in education not change future intentions to apply to univer-
sity? One explanation is that the perceptions and intentions of website
users are not (at themargin) inﬂuenced by these considerations. Another
explanation is that the announcement of the trebling of university fees
and resulting controversy outweighed the inﬂuence of accessing the web-
site.
To shed some light on this issue, we consider what happens to the con-
trol group between the ﬁrst and second surveys (conducted 8–12 weeks
apart). We regress each of the outcome variables considered above on
Costs and Beneﬁts of Educational Decisions 501
T
A
B
L
E
4
T
h
e
E
ff
ec
t
o
f
th
e
T
re
at
m
en
t
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
M
ea
n
at
B
as
el
in
e
(C
o
n
tr
o
l
Sc
h
o
o
ls
)
(1
)
E
ff
ec
t
o
f
T
re
at
m
en
t
(I
n
te
n
ti
o
n
to
T
re
at
;
O
L
S)
(2
)
E
ff
ec
t
o
f
T
re
at
m
en
t
o
n
th
e
T
re
at
ed
(A
cc
es
s
W
eb
si
te
;
IV
)
(3
)
Sa
m
e
as
C
o
l.
3,
In
cl
u
d
in
g
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
W
h
o
A
cc
es
se
s
th
e
W
eb
si
te
(I
V
)
(4
)
K
n
o
w
le
d
ge
o
f
St
u
d
en
t
F
in
an
ce
K
n
o
w
th
at
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
fe
es
ar
e
p
ai
d
af
te
r
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
an
d
h
av
e
a
jo
b
.4
5
.0
8*
**
(.
02
)
.4
2*
**
(.
10
)
.4
1*
**
(.
09
)
St
u
d
en
t
lo
an
s
ar
e
a
ch
ea
p
er
/
b
et
te
r
w
ay
to
b
o
rr
o
w
m
o
n
ey
th
an
o
th
er
ty
p
es
o
f
b
o
rr
o
w
in
g:
ag
re
e
.5
1
.0
5*
**
(.
01
)
.2
6*
**
(.
07
)
.2
5*
**
(.
07
)
P
er
ce
iv
ed
Im
p
o
rt
an
ce
o
f
F
in
an
ci
al
C
o
n
st
ra
in
t
W
o
u
ld
th
e
ﬁ
n
an
ci
al
co
st
o
f
st
ay
in
g
in
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
p
re
ve
n
t
yo
u
fr
o
m
st
ay
in
g
o
n
in
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
af
te
r
Ye
ar
11
?
ye
s
.1
1
2
.0
2
(.
01
)
2
.1
0
(.
07
)
2
.0
7
(.
06
)
W
o
u
ld
th
e
ﬁ
n
an
ci
al
as
p
ec
t
o
f
go
in
g
to
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
m
ak
e
yo
u
th
in
k
o
f
n
o
t
ap
p
ly
in
g?
ye
s
.2
4
2
.0
0
(.
02
)
2
.0
1
(.
10
)
.0
4
(.
09
)
G
o
in
g
to
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
is
to
o
ex
p
en
si
ve
fo
r
m
e
an
d
m
y
fa
m
il
y:
ye
s
.2
3
2
.0
1
(.
02
)
2
.0
5
(.
09
)
2
.0
1
(.
09
)
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
C
o
st
G
o
in
g
to
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
w
o
u
ld
m
ea
n
w
ai
ti
n
g
to
o
lo
n
g
b
ef
o
re
I
co
u
ld
ea
rn
a
fu
ll
-t
im
e
w
ag
e:
ag
re
e
.2
5
2
.0
4*
**
(.
01
)
2
.2
1*
**
(.
08
)
2
.1
8*
*
(.
07
)
502
T
A
B
L
E
4
(C
on
ti
n
u
ed
)
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
M
ea
n
at
B
as
el
in
e
(C
o
n
tr
o
l
Sc
h
o
o
ls
)
(1
)
E
ff
ec
t
o
f
T
re
at
m
en
t
(I
n
te
n
ti
o
n
to
T
re
at
;
O
L
S)
(2
)
E
ff
ec
t
o
f
T
re
at
m
en
t
o
n
th
e
T
re
at
ed
(A
cc
es
s
W
eb
si
te
;
IV
)
(3
)
Sa
m
e
as
C
o
l.
3,
In
cl
u
d
in
g
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
W
h
o
A
cc
es
se
s
th
e
W
eb
si
te
(I
V
)
(4
)
K
n
o
w
le
d
ge
ab
o
u
t
B
en
eﬁ
ts
o
f
P
o
st
co
m
p
u
ls
o
ry
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
B
et
te
r
ch
an
ce
o
f
ge
tt
in
g
a
jo
b
if
st
ay
s
o
n
to
18
:
ag
re
e
.8
0
.0
2*
(.
01
)
.1
1*
(.
06
)
.0
9
(.
06
)
B
et
te
r
ch
an
ce
o
f
ge
tt
in
g
a
jo
b
if
go
es
to
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
(v
s.
le
av
in
g
at
18
):
ag
re
e
.8
1
.0
3*
*
(.
01
)
.1
4*
*
(.
07
)
.1
2*
*
(.
06
)
W
il
le
ar
n
ab
o
u
t
th
e
sa
m
e
n
o
m
at
te
r
w
h
at
su
b
je
ct
I
st
u
d
y:
ag
re
e/
d
o
n
’t
kn
o
w
.4
2
2
.0
2
(.
02
)
2
.1
1
(.
09
)
2
.1
0
(.
08
)
W
il
l
ea
rn
ab
o
u
t
th
e
sa
m
e
n
o
m
at
te
r
w
h
at
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
I
go
to
:
ag
re
e/
d
o
n
’t
kn
o
w
.5
3
2
.0
4*
*
(.
02
)
2
.2
1*
*
(.
09
)
2
.2
1*
*
(.
09
)
F
u
tu
re
In
te
n
ti
o
n
s
P
la
n
to
st
ay
o
n
in
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
af
te
r
ag
e
16
.7
6
.0
4*
**
(.
01
)
.2
2*
*
(.
09
)
.2
1*
*
(.
08
)
V
er
y/
fa
ir
ly
li
ke
ly
w
il
le
ve
r
ap
p
ly
to
go
to
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
to
d
o
a
d
eg
re
e
.8
7
2
.0
1
(.
01
)
2
.0
4
(.
07
)
2
.0
5
(.
06
)
V
er
y
li
ke
ly
w
il
l
ev
er
ap
p
ly
to
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
to
d
o
a
d
eg
re
e
.6
0
2
.0
0
(.
02
)
2
.0
2
(.
09
)
2
.0
6
(.
08
)
N
o
te
.—
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
fo
r
6,
61
4
st
u
d
en
ts
.
H
o
w
ev
er
,
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
o
n
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
.
T
h
is
b
ri
n
gs
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
d
o
w
n
to
ab
o
u
t
5,
40
0
(w
h
ic
h
d
o
es
n
o
t
m
ak
e
m
u
ch
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
to
re
gr
es
si
o
n
es
ti
m
at
es
).
T
h
e
co
n
tr
o
lv
ar
ia
b
le
s
ar
e
th
o
se
u
se
d
to
p
re
d
ic
t
w
h
et
h
er
o
r
n
o
t
th
e
st
u
d
en
t
ac
ce
ss
es
th
e
w
eb
si
te
(t
ab
le
3)
.A
ll
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s
co
n
tr
o
lf
o
r
sc
h
o
o
lp
ai
rs
th
at
w
er
e
u
se
d
fo
r
b
et
w
ee
n
-s
ch
o
o
lr
an
d
o
m
iz
at
io
n
.S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
,i
n
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,a
re
cl
u
s-
te
re
d
o
n
sc
h
o
o
ls
(n
u
m
b
er
o
f
cl
u
st
er
s
5
54
).
*
p
<
.1
.
**
p
<
.0
5.
**
*
p
<
.0
1.
503
a time dummy for whether the question is being asked in the follow-up
survey. The results are shown in table 5. Students’ knowledge of when uni-
versity fees are paid signiﬁcantly improved between surveys. In ﬁgure 2,
we plot the kernel density function of students’ estimate of the actual cost
of university (fees only). This shows that all students (whether in treat-
ment or control schools) had a better knowledge of the costs of university
when asked about it a second time.15 This may reﬂect the ﬂow of informa-
tion between surveys (for everyone) or ease of access to this knowledge be-
cause of the announcement about the rise in tuition fees (in autumn
2010) and the extent of publicity about the changes (which we document
above, but the most signiﬁcant of which was the near trebling of student
fees from £3,300 to £9,000 per year).
In table 5, there is a big increase in the perceived ﬁnancial constraint of
going to university between surveys. This is consistent with the increased
awareness of howmuch going to university would cost (i.e., in ﬁg. 2). This
is a plausible explanation for why the expectation of applying to univer-
sity in the future decreased between surveys; while understanding of the
nature of ﬁnance increased, students also became more concerned by
the increase in fees.
However, it is interesting to note that many other variables are un-
changed for the control group between the ﬁrst and second waves. For
example, none of the variables about the beneﬁts of staying on in educa-
tion change between the ﬁrst and second waves for the control group,
and they are unchanged in their intention to stay on in full-time educa-
tion beyond the age of 16. These are among the variables that should
be inﬂuenced by our information campaign but not by government an-
nouncements on tuition fees or media coverage about the costs of going
to university.
Thus, a plausible reason why our information campaign does not inﬂu-
ence the treatment group about the costs of university, the perceived ﬁ-
nancial constraint implied by going to university, or intentions to apply
to university is that any potential effect on these dimensions was out-
weighed by the controversy about the hike in tuition fees that took place
over the time of our ﬁeldwork.
C. Measures of Expected Wages
A key reason to go to university is, of course, the wage returns associated
with higher education. Students were asked various questions of the fol-
lowing kind: “Imagine that you left school after Year 11 and tried to ﬁnd
a job. Think about the kinds of jobs you might be offered and what you
might accept. What is your best guess of what you would earn per year
at age 30?” They were asked similar questions for expected earnings con-
15 Differences between treatment and control schools are not signiﬁcant here.
504 Journal of Human Capital
TABLE 5
What Happens to Control Group between Survey 1 and Survey 2?
Dependent Variable
Mean at Baseline
(Control Schools)
Coefﬁcient on Time Dummy
for Second Survey
Knowledge of Student Finance
Know that university fees are paid
after university and have a job .45 .098***
(.017)
Student loans are a cheaper/better
way to borrow money than other
types of borrowing: agree .51 2.016
(.015)
Perceived Importance of Financial Constraint
Would the ﬁnancial cost of staying in
education prevent you from staying
on in education after Year 11? yes .11 .034***
(.010)
Would the ﬁnancial aspect of going to
university make you think of not
applying? yes .24 .048***
(.016)
Going to university is too expensive for
me and my family: yes .23 .059***
(.017)
Opportunity Cost
Going to university would mean waiting
too long before I could earn a
full-time wage: agree .25 .026***
(.010)
Knowledge about Beneﬁts of Postcompulsory Education
Better chance of getting a job if stays
on to 18: agree .80 2.007
(.010)
Better chance of getting a job if goes to
university (vs. leaving at 18): agree .81 2.007
(.010)
Will earn about the same no matter what
subject I study: agree/don’t know .42 2.010
(.013)
Will earn about the same no matter what
university I go to: agree/don’t know .53 .015
(.011)
Future Intentions
Plan to stay on in full-time education
after age 16 .76 .006
(.013)
Very/fairly likely will ever apply to go to
university to do a degree .87 2.021**
(.009)
Very likely will ever apply to university
to do a degree .60 2.032**
(.014)
Note.—Regressions are estimated for 5,596 students in the control group. Standard errors,
in parentheses, are clustered on schools (number of clusters 5 27).
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
ditional on leaving full-time education at age 18 and age 21.16 However,
our survey uncovers huge variation in students’ estimates of the wage re-
turns to education. This is shown in ﬁgure 3, which illustrates the ratio of
students’ expected earnings for higher education relative to expected
earnings if they were to leave school at age 16.17 As well as huge variation
16 Where this information ismissing, we impute a response as long as a response is given in
at least oneof six earnings questions in either survey 1 or survey 2. After imputation, there are
only 6 percent of students for whom we have no information. The kernel density plots ex-
clude those with an implied estimated earnings ratio of over 10 (about 5 percent of the dis-
tribution in the case of expected earnings in higher education to leaving school after age 16).
17 If we plot the ratio of expected earnings for leaving full-time education at 18 compared
to 16, we ﬁnd that this is lower on average and the distribution is more compressed. The
Figure 2.—Expected (log) yearly cost of going to university (fees only). Color version avail-
able as an online enhancement.
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in responses, there is a long right tail in the distribution: many students
vastly overestimate returns (which is consistent with the literature). How-
ever, themedian student does have a reasonable idea (which is also shown
in table 2). The ﬁgures suggest that the treatment may have increased the
density at the middle of the distribution (especially for students who ac-
cessed the website), although coefﬁcients do not come out as signiﬁcant
Figure 3.—Ratio of own expected earnings at age 30: higher education relative to leaving
school at age 16. A, Treatment versus control schools, wave 1. B, Treatment versus control
schools, wave 2.C,Website versus non–website users in treatment schools, wave 1.D,Website
versus non–website users in treatment schools, wave 2. Color version available as an online
enhancement.
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distribution is similar in treatment and control schools and there is no treatment effect. We
also asked students about expected earnings for other people (not themselves). Results
were very similar and are not discussed here.
in regressions.Our treatmentmaterials alsoprovided informationonearn-
ings by subject of degree. However, we did not ﬁnd any pattern of results
suggesting that the information campaignhadchanged thepreferred sub-
ject of study, and we do not focus on these results (which are available on
request).
D. Future Intentions
We now look more closely at variables that are associated with future in-
tentions about educational investment decisions: whether the student
plans to stay on in full-time education beyond the age of 16 and whether
he or she is likely to apply to attend university at some stage.
Figure 3 (Continued)
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In table 6, we show the intention to treat effect for both of these vari-
ables, including other controls that we expect to be important (as moti-
vated in Sec. V). We also (again) show the treatment on the treated effect
in both cases (cols. 3 and 4). The point of showing these regressions is
simply to investigate the relevance of other variables likely to inﬂuence
the educational investment decision, alongside the effects of the treatment,
which we know had a strong positive impact on students’ reported inten-
tions to stay on after age 16, although not on intentions to go to university.
This helps to establish that the variables measuring future intentions have
real informational content.
The IV estimate (of the treatment on the treated) is not directly com-
parable to coefﬁcients for these other variables because it is a LATE (i.e.,
is relevant only for those students who accessed the website). Further-
more, the other variables are only proxies for underlying factors (in a
TABLE 6
Future Intentions
Whether Plans to Stay on in
Full-Time Education after 16
Whether Plans to Apply to
University at Some Stage
OLS
(Intention
to Treat)
(1)
Treatment on
the Treated
(IV: Website User)
(2)
OLS
(Intention
to Treat)
(3)
Treatment on
the Treated
(IV: Website User)
(4)
Treatment .04*** .21** 2.01 -.05
(.01) (.08) (.01) (.06)
Male 2.07*** 2.05*** 2.04** 2.04**
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Books in the home .03*** .03*** .02*** .02***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Talks a lot to teachers/
friends/family about
careers .02* .02* .04*** .04***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Good at math .09*** .09*** .06*** .06***
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Good at English .04*** .05*** .04** .04**
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Likes math .02 .02 .03** .03**
(.02) (.02) (.01) (.01)
Likes English .01 .01 .00 .00
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Locus of control .08*** .08*** .05*** .05***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Self-esteem .01 .01 .03*** .03***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Present oriented 2.05*** 2.05*** 2.02*** 2.02***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Observations 5,366 5,366 5,380 5,380
R 2 .12 .10 .10 .10
Note.—See note for table 4.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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reduced-form context). Nonetheless, it is of interest to show the associa-
tion between these variables and decisions to stay on.
The regressions show that boys are less likely both to intend to stay on
in full-time education and to apply to university at some stage. They also
show that students from more advantaged family backgrounds are more
likely to stay on in full-time education and apply to university at some
stage. This is not surprising and is in line with what is actually observed
with regard to both dropout and university attendance (e.g., Maania
and Kalbb 2007; Chowdry et al. 2013; Murnane 2013). We ﬁnd the vari-
ables that we expect to positively inﬂuence the intention to stay on in ed-
ucation after 16 and apply to university do so, namely, the measures of
cognitive ability (though note that self-assessed ability is relevant here
rather than whether the student likes math, in contrast to accessing the
website where only liking math was relevant), locus of control (though
not self-conﬁdence), and ﬁnding out about the consequences of educa-
tional choices by talking to teachers/family/friends. Measures of cogni-
tive ability are also associated with these educational intentions. Finally,
being present oriented (i.e., higher discount rates) is negatively associ-
ated with the intention to stay on in education, again as we would expect.
This exercise shows that variables expected to inﬂuence the intention
to stay on in education do so in the expected direction, as they have been
shown to in many other studies about educational investment decisions.
Thus, it seems likely that variables thatmeasure future intentions do have
real informational content.
E. Heterogeneity
Finally, we consider whether there is a heterogeneous effect of the treat-
ment on the intention to stay on in full-time education beyond the age
of 16. We focus on this measure because of its potential relationship with
the actual staying on decision and because this is strongly inﬂuenced by
accessing the website. We consider whether effects are different for males
or females and whether they are different for those with higher and lower
family resources (proxied by books in the household). The sample is fairly
evenly split in these dimensions (although there are fewer boys than girls).
We choose these groups because they have been identiﬁed in the litera-
ture as particularly vulnerable when it comes to staying on in education.
Heterogeneity by gender is of interest because boys aremore likely to drop
out of education before girls (e.g., as discussed by Goldin and Katz [2008]
and Murnane [2013]). Socioeconomic background is also strongly asso-
ciated with the staying on decision, with youths from disadvantaged back-
grounds more likely to drop out (e.g., Kearney and Levine 2015).
In table 7, we estimate the effect of the treatment on the treated for
four different subgroups: those from lower socioeconomic groups (i.e.,
proxied by below-median books in the home), those from higher socio-
economic groups, boys, and girls. In column 1, we show the intention
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to stay on in full-time education at baseline for each of these groups. The
gap between low and high socioeconomic groups is high (13 percentage
points), and there is also a gap between boys and girls (4 percentage
points), in line with the literature described above. In column 2, we show
the proportions of each group that access the website (in treatment
schools). Of those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, about 11 per-
cent access the website, compared to 21 percent of those from higher so-
cioeconomic backgrounds. The proportion of boys accessing the website
is only a little lower (1 percentage point) than for girls.
In columns 3, 4, and 5, we show IV estimates of the treatment on the
treated for each of these four groups. In column 3, we estimate the IV re-
gressions without including any other controls (apart from school pairs
that were used for randomization). In column 4, we include controls used
to predict access to the website. In column 5, we also include a control for
the baseline response of students (i.e., whether or not they intended to
stay on in full-time education). The coefﬁcients do not change verymuch
between speciﬁcations, but the precision improves when the baseline re-
sponse is included.
The regressions show that accessing the website has an effect for all
groups, even though it is statistically signiﬁcant for all groups only in the
TABLE 7
Whether Plans to Stay on in Post-16 Full-Time Education:
Heterogeneity in the Effects of Accessing the Website
IV Estimate: Accessing the Website
Subgroup
Baseline:
Intention to
Stay on in
Full-Time
Education
Post-16
(1)
% Accessing
Website
in Treatment
Schools
(2)
No
Controls
(3)
With
Controls
(4)
With
Controls
and for
Baseline
Response
(5)
Lower income:
below median of
books in household
(N 5 2,601) .72 .11 .60***
(.16)
.52***
(.16)
.45***
(.11)
Higher income:
above median of
books in household
(N 5 2,741) .85 .21 .05
(.06)
.06
(.05)
.08*
(.05)
Boys (N 5 2,354) .76 .16 .29**
(.14)
.28**
(.13)
.25**
(.11)
Girls (N 5 3,012) .80 .17 .18
(.11)
.14
(.11)
.15*
(.09)
Note.—Regression estimates are shown in cols. 3, 4, and 5. The regressions are separately
estimated for each subgroup. All regressions control for school pairs that were used for
between-school randomization. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on school.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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ﬁnal speciﬁcation. However, it is striking that the estimated effect is about
ﬁve times higher for students from lower socioeconomic backgroundswho
accessed thewebsite, compared to those fromhigher socioeconomicgroups,
and it is about 60 percent higher for boys compared to girls. This suggests
that the information treatment is potentially most useful and inﬂuential
to groups most at risk of dropping out. However, since these groups are
less likely to access the information, it might still be ineffectual unless they
are encouraged to access such information.
VII. Conclusion
Students appear to drop out of education even though there is the poten-
tial for high returns had they investedmore in postcompulsory education.
A contributory factor may be that they have insufﬁcient knowledge about
the costs and beneﬁts of education at an appropriate time in their school-
ing (which might potentially inﬂuence their effort and motivation). In
this paper, we ﬁnd that many students in London schools do not know
some basic facts about the costs and beneﬁts of pursuing postcompul-
sory education when in their penultimate year of compulsory schooling.
A simple and inexpensive information campaign canbe effective for those
choosing to access the information, at least for inﬂuencing short-term in-
tentions. Of course, in the future, it will be interesting to consider to what
extent this intervention has an impact on actual behavior. In the future,
administrative data will allow us to consider this for about 60 percent of
the sample (mostly students who attended state schools that can be linked
to administrative data).
This study illustrates that the mere existence of cheaply available infor-
mation does not mean that individuals will actually choose to acquire it.
Only 16 percent of students in treated schools chose to access the website,
even though we tried to encourage them to do so through various means
and got their teachers involved. Factors positively associated with access-
ing the website include student ability and preferences for education,
coming from a higher socioeconomic group (reﬂected both by books in
the home and going to an independent school), and having a lower dis-
count rate. These are among the same factors known to inﬂuence the hu-
man capital investment decision. The literature on ﬁnancial literacy and
optimal portfolio management suggests that investing in ﬁnancial knowl-
edge is itself a form of human capital investment (which is correlated with
preexisting human capital). Individuals invest in ﬁnancial knowledge to
the point where themarginal cost of doing so equals themarginal beneﬁt.
The factors weﬁnd to be associatedwith accessing thewebsite (e.g., ability,
family resources, the discount rate) are the same variables one would ex-
pect to inﬂuence human capital decisions as well as other investment de-
cisions more broadly.
Even though access to the website is free, it does involve an opportunity
cost of time and an effort in processing information (the cost of which is
emphasized by literature on rationally inattentive agents). Thus, perhaps
512 Journal of Human Capital
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unsurprisingly, our study shows that it can be difﬁcult to persuade teen-
agers to take an interest. For those who did take an interest and used the
website, our study shows a positive effect on their knowledge and on the in-
tention to pursue postcompulsory education. However, we also show that
those less likely to access the information (those from lower socioeco-
nomic groups and boys) havemore to beneﬁt fromdoing so, as effect sizes
are much larger for these groups. Thus, our experiment shows that the
short-term impact of accessing information (via the website) had a higher
effect on thosemost at risk at dropping out of full-time education after ﬁn-
ishing their compulsory years of schooling, namely, boys and those from
lower socioeconomic groups. This is an important issue for policy makers
who are concerned with designing cost-effective ways of providing infor-
mation to the population at large and also to those tasked with widening
participation in higher education—a key policy goal in the United King-
dom and United States. Our ﬁndings suggest that simply providing infor-
mation on the costs andbeneﬁts of education (e.g., onwebsites or through
the media), even in a very simple format, will not be effective for students
who perceive (rightly or wrongly) that it is too difﬁcult or costly to process
the information and take account of it in their situations.One solution is to
tailor information more closely to individual situations and provide it at
the right time (which is not straightforward at a large scale). Another solu-
tion is to ensure that career advice andguidance are properly embedded in
the high school curriculum, thus reducing the scope formaking poorly in-
formed decisions about postcompulsory education.
Appendix A
Questions Used as Outcome Variables
Full questionnaires are downloadable on http://www.whats4.me.uk.
Knowledge of Student Finance
D3. When do you think most people pay their university fees? (tick one box): be-
fore the start of each year at university; immediately after they ﬁnish university;
when they ﬁnish university and have a job; don’t know.
A1. Student loans a cheaper/better way to borrow money than other types of
borrowing (e.g. credit cards). Strongly agree; agree; disagree; strongly disagree;
don’t know.
Perceived Importance of Financial Constraint
D2. Would the ﬁnancial cost of staying on in education prevent you from staying
on in education after Year 11? Yes; no; don’t know.
D5.Would the ﬁnancial aspect of going to university (that is the cost of fees and
living expenses) make you think of NOT applying? Yes; no; don’t know.
A1. Going to university is too expensive for me and my family. Strongly agree;
agree; disagree; strongly disagree; don’t know.
Opportunity Cost
A1. Going to university would mean waiting too long before I could earn a full-
time wage. Strongly agree; agree; disagree; strongly disagree; don’t know.
Knowledge about Beneﬁts of Staying On
C7. Do you think that a person has a better or worse chance of getting a job if he/
she stays in education up to age 18 compared to leaving school after Year 11?
Would you say it is: much worse; worse; same; better; much better.
C8. Do you think that a person has a better or worse chance of getting a job if
he/she goes to university compared to leaving education at age 18?Would you say
it is: much worse; worse; same; better; much better.
A1. If I get a university degree, I will earn about the same no matter what sub-
ject I study: strongly agree; agree; disagree; strongly disagree; don’t know.
A1. If I get a university degree, I will earn about the same no matter what uni-
versity I go to: strongly agree; agree; disagree; strongly disagree; don’t know.
Estimates of Costs and Beneﬁts
D3. What do you think is the yearly cost of sending a person to university? ( just in
terms of tuition fees).
E1. Imagine that you left school after Year 11 and tried to ﬁnd a job. Think
about the kinds of jobs you might be offered and what you might accept. What
is your best guess of what you would earn per year at age 30?
E2. Imagine that you continued at school after Year 11 or went to a College of
Further Education (or a Sixth Form College). And then, tried to ﬁnd a job at
around 18. Think about the kinds of job youmight be offered andwhat youmight
accept. What is your best guess of what you would earn per year at age 30?
E3. Imagine that you continued in education and went to university (or other
type of higher education) for 3 or 4 years. Think about the kinds of job youmight
be offered and what you might accept after this (leaving full-time education at
about age 21). What is your best guess of what you would earn per year at age 30?
Future Intentions
C1. When you are 16 and have ﬁnished Year 11 at school, what do you plan to do
next? Tick one box. Stay in full-time education; start working full-time; start learn-
ing a trade/start work-based training; something else; don’t know.
C4. How likely do you think it is that you will ever apply to go to university to do
a degree?Would you say it is: very likely, fairly likely, not very likely, not at all likely,
don’t know.
Appendix B
Variable Descriptions
Full questionnaires are downloadable on http://www.whats4.me.uk.
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Books in the Home
F4: How many books are there in your home? Categories are: 0–10 books; 11–25
books; 26–100 books, 101–200 books; 201–500 books; more than 500 books.
In the analysis these categories are ranked 0–6 and standardized to have mean
zero and standard deviation one.
Talks a Lot to Teachers/Friends/Family about Careers
B1: Thinking about plans for studying in the future, how often to you talk about
these things to the following people? (5 options given from “not at all” to “a lot”):
With teachers as part of a lesson; with teachers outside lessons; with a careers ad-
visor who is not one of your teachers; with members of your family; with friends.
In this analysis “talks a lot” 5 1 if the student says they talk a lot to teachers or
friends or family.
Good at Math/Good at English
A4. How good would you say you were at each of the following subjects? . . . Op-
tions provided are as follows: very good, fairly good; not very good; no good at all,
do not take this subject.
In the analysis, “good at Maths” (English) 5 1 if the student says they are very
good or fairly good at math (English).
Likes Math/Likes English
A3. For each subject listed below, please tick one of the boxes according to how
much you like/dislike each subject. Options provided are as follows: like it a lot;
like it a little; don’t like it very much; don’t like it at all; do not take this subject.
In the analysis, “likes Maths” (English) 5 1 if the student says they like math
(English) a lot or a little.
Locus of Control and Self-Concept (Referred to as “Self-Esteem”)
G1. How do you feel about the following (13) statements? These questions were
adopted from the National Education Longitudinal Survey of 1988 (NELS: 88).
Items were drawn from the NELS:88 questionnaire, as applied by the Early Child
Longitudinal Survey (K–8). Students were asked the degree to which they agreed
with 13 statements about themselves and about how much control they felt they
had over their own lives. They rated whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,” “dis-
agree,” or “strongly disagree” with each item. Scores were calculated with the
same procedures at NELS:88. Some items were positively worded and some were
negatively worded.
In the analysis, standardized scores for locus of control and self-esteem are in-
cluded, with mean zero and standard deviation one.
Present Oriented
I1. If you were offered £1,000 today or £1,100 in one year’s time, what would you
prefer?
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